One Year Review of Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations by Kopel, Gerald H.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 39 Issue 2 Article 1 
April 2021 
One Year Review of Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations 
Gerald H. Kopel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Gerald H. Kopel, One Year Review of Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations, 39 Dicta 61 (1962). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
MARCH-APRIL, 1962
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS
By GERALD H. KOPEL*
Most of this article will deal with the law of agency because
the Colorado Supreme Court decisions in the field of business asso-
ciations were concerned mainly with agency law.
I. AGENCY
A. Fiduciary Duty
The fiduciary duty owed by an agent to his principal is the
cornerstone of their relationship. Competition by the agent without
the consent of the principal was justifiably disapproved by the
Colorado Supreme Court in 1961 in several cases.
In Dawson v. Clark,' plaintiff sold his business to defendants and
contracted to remain as an employee in a "supervisory capacity"
for one year. Before the year ended, plaintiff was fired. The court
held that dismissal of plaintiff was justified because while he was
employed he "carried on the same type of business in his own name
and at times submitted bids in competition with'"2 his employers.
The case provides good orthodox law from Bilz v. Powell;3
namely, that a servant cannot engage in any business or employ-
ment in competition with his master, which may tend to injure the
latter's business, without the consent of his master. The supreme
court notes, without comment, the lower courts decision to award
plaintiff money found to be due on account of services rendered
prior to the date of his discharge. This would appear to support the
paraphrasing of another rule enunciated in Bilz v. Powell;4 the rule,
that is by no means uniform throughout the country, that a servant,
justifiably discharged for a breach of fiduciary duty, is still entitled
to compensation already earned and accrued.
In Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Kelley,5 two former sales
agents of plaintiff were enjoined from engaging in competition
with plaintiff. The injunction was based upon a provision of the
contract entered into by the salesmen at the time of their employ-
ment.6 The supreme court found tho provision to be reasonable and
a sufficient block to the use of advantageous information, concern-
ing present and prospective customers of plaintiff, which defendants
acquired in connection with their employment.
Member of the Denver firm of Kopel and Kopel.
3 358 P.2d 591 (Colo. 1961).
2 358 P.2d 591, 592 (Colo. 1961).
350 Colo. 482, 117 Pec. 344 (1911).
4 Ibid.
5 362 P.2d 184 (Colo. 1961).
6 Id. at 185. "Incmuch as Salesman through his connection with Compny will obtain confi-
dential information recirding Company's methods of doing business, records, and the names and
requirements of users of Company's equipment throughout Company's territory, which it would be
improper to use to Company's detriment, or in competition with Company, therefor, in port consid-
eration for this agreement Salesman expressly hereby agrees and covenants that for a period of
one year from and after the termination of this Contract by either party he will not, without the
written consent of Company, engage, directly or indirectly, for himself or as agent or employee
of another in the manufacturing, selling, buying, dealing or servicing of . . . within 100 miles of ......
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Several other cases dealt with competition.7
B. Apparent Authority
Defendants purchased land from the City of Aurora.8 The written
offer (which was accepted by the city council) included a promise
by defendants to place a drainage pipe on their land of the same
size, and connecting with two city-maintained drainage pipes located
on opposite boundaries. Defendants sought instruction and approval
of their proposed plans and specifications for the drainage pipe
from the city manager. They were referred to the city engineer,
who rejected their plans and who then himself designed the pipe
which was installed by the defendants. The pipe installed was
smaller than the connecting pipes. Concrete was poured into the
void left at the connections, forming an unbroken, continuing tube.
All this was done at the direction and dictate of the city engineer,
who, after suggesting minor changes which were made, approved
the end result.
Following heavy rains, the neighborhood was flooded, due
allegedly to the failure of the smaller connecting pipe to adequately
carry the runoff from the larger pipe. Landowners sued defendants
and the city for damages resulting from flooding. The city sought
damages by cross-claim from defendants for their failure to con-
struct a pipe of the same size as the connecting pipes. All issues
were settled except those between the city and defendants. The
lower court entered judgment in favor of the city, which judgment
was reversed by the supreme court.
The supreme court conceded that the engineer had no actual
authority to modify the terms of the contract; since he could not
have entered into the contract, he was not expressly empowered
to modify it. But, the court stated, a municipal corporation cannot
supervise every detail of performance and then repudiate the
supervisory authority of its own engineer, by claiming that the
contracting party should have disregarded the instructions of the
city's agent, notwithstanding the agent's disapproval. There was
"justifiable reliance on the appearance of authority which was
exhibited to these defendants."9 The reliance was to their detri-
ment.
Besides using the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court quotes
Seavy and the Restatement'0 on the estoppel theory of apparent
authority, as a basis for its decision. Normally, to qualify under
this theory, there is needed: (a) a principal who, by his conduct,
has misrepresented the existence of authority of an "agent" to a
third person, and (b) reliance by the third person on appearance
of authority and a subsequent change of position. The principal is
then bound because he is estopped to deny the "truth of his words."
7 England v. Colorado Agency Co.. 359 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1961); Swart v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator
Co., 360 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1961). In Swart v. Mid-Continent, two defendant partners were doing
business under the trade name "Mid-Commercial Refrigeration Co." Plaintiff's firm was "Mid-
Continent Refrigerator Co." The defendants were former employees of Mid-Continent, and one
was discharged after plaintiff discovered he was soliciting business for Mid-Commercial. The
supreme court concluded that the obvious purpose of defendants in adopting a name similar to
that of plaintiff was to benefit from the goodwill established by plaintiff, and approved the con-
tinuation of an injunction against defendants' use of the trade-name.
8 Franks v. City of Aurora, 362 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961).
9 Id. at 563.
10 Seavy, Studies in Agency 184 (1949); Restatement, Agency § 8 (1958).
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There is no contract between the principal and the third person with
whom the "agent" deals. The one estopped (the principal) is given
no rights, and the third person is either compensated for his loss
or protected from harm.
While inclusion of the doctrine of apparent authority by estoppel
does not detract from the justifiable decision rendered, it does add
more fuel to the twin flames which light the rationale by which
too many cases of similar nature are decided, i.e., estoppel and rati-
fication. Where the court is handicapped in finding a change in
position necessary for estoppel, or where the facts justify holding
each side bound to a contract, ratification is used. The "contract"
theory of apparent authority has been misplaced in Colorado.
Nout,, Te.. . I m~r. ep ,.-
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Under the contract theory, there is a "real" contract from the
inception under which each party has both rights and liabilities.
There is no need for straining the facts to fit the multi-requirements
of ratification, or to find a change in position.'Each theory has its
proper place, and should be used where justified by the facts.
Seavy, the author quoted by the supreme court in speaking of
estoppel as an aspect of apparent authority, favors the contract
approach."
C. Agent or Independent Contractor
In Argonaut Builders, Inc. v. Dare,2 defendant was engaged in
soliciting building contracts, and in representing plaintiff in other
dealings with customers; profits and losses to be divided 60-40.
Because of the nature of the business, defendant's share of the
profits was often delayed, and plaintiff made regular advances in
varying amounts which coincided with the bringing in of business.
Defendant received weekly statements from plaintiff which showed
profits credited, losses debited, the old deficit and the new deficit
based upon advances made.
There was no written contract to show the exact nature of the
relationship of plaintiff and defendant. When defendant termin-
ated his work with plaintiff, he was overdrawn on plaintiff's books,
based upon the advances, for $2,473. Plaintiff sued to recover the
money, claiming it was loaned to defendant and that defendant
was an independent contractor. Defendant maintained that he was
a commission salesman (therefore an agent); that the sum involved
constituted drawing account advances (thus in the nature of
salary) and no repayment was contemplated.
At the end of plaintiff's case, defendant's motion to dismiss was
granted. The supreme court reversed the trial court and held that
plaintiff's evidence that defendant was an independent contractor
was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.
A hasty reading of this decision could lead to erroneous conclu-
sions. The court says that "from the circumstances it appears that
the defendant operated . . .free of control by the plaintiff." 13 How-
ever, the circumstances showing absence of control were not fully
explained in the decision. The payment to defendant based upon
the amount of profit, in the form of advances which varied as to
amounts, and the plaintiff's running tabulation of defendant's
account with weekly statements to the defendant is as conducive
to a finding of principal-agent as it is to a finding of independent
contractor.
4
Of much greater significance is the sharing of losses by defend-
ant. Sharing of profits by an agent as an inducement for greater
efficiency is now a normal custom, but the sharing of losses to the
extent that an "agent" might earn less than zero annually, would
certainly not be customary.
Although the court does seem to stress the fluctuation in "the
manner of making advances"'15 by plaintiff, it is difficult to tell
11 Seavy, The Rationale of Agency, 29 Yale Li.J. 859, 873 (1920); Seavy, Studies in Agency 82-83
(1949).
12 359 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1961).
13 Id. at 367.
142 Am. Jur. Aqency J 311 (1936).
1 . Supro note 12, at 367.
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL, 1962
whether this applied to the varying amounts paid (ranging from
$10 to $400) or to a time lapse in the periods when the sums were
paid. Nor is it clear whether this fluctuation is evidence of the
non-existence of principal-agent relationship, or of a debt regard-
less of the relationship.
However, the rule suggested by the court would appear to be:
Payments to an employee in the nature of advances are wages or
salary when they (a) are to be charged to and deducted from
commissions agreed upon as the same may accrue, and (b) are
made in regular amounts in consideration of continued activity by
the employee. Because of this regularity of payment and the require-
ment that the employee give full time to his employment, the.
presumption arises that the advances are recoverable only from
commissions and thus the excess cannot be collected by the employ-
er in absence of an express or implied agreement to repay.
D. Vicarious Liability - Respondeat Superior
1. Joint Employers. - In Colorado & S. Ry. v. Duffy Storage &
Moving Van Co., 16 a train, operating under a joint agreement by
the Colorado and Southern Railway Company and the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, negligently damaged plaintiff's
truck, trailer, and crane. Defendant Santa Fe claimed it had nothing
to do with operation of the train and should not be held respon-
sible for negligent operation by the engineer. The engineer was
an employee of Colorado and Southern Railway Company, but, on
the "run" of the train at the time of the accident, he was paid by
Santa Fe and was responsible to the Santa Fe superintendent.
The supreme court held both railroads liable as joint employers
"notwithstanding the particular service being rendered was for
only one of the employers, and the employee was paid directly by
only one of the joint employers. The legal rule of liability cannot
be affected by a contract which provides that one of several joint
employers shall bear the entire responsibility for the act of their
joint employee."' 7 The court then points out that the matter of
who made payments is not determinative in this case, stating that
liability would apply against one who "knowingly and without
objection receives the benefits of labor, or holds out to the public
one as engaged in his service ... when the act or failure constitut-
ing the negligence comes within the apparent scope of the servant's
employment .... "'s quoting Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Gustafson.19
If the court is basing its decision upon a holding out to the
public and an apparent scope of employment, then it is conceivably
using the language of apparent authority by estoppel, and comment
is required.
The facts in the Gustafson case are considerably different from
the facts in Colorado & S. Ry. v. Duffy Storage & Moving Van Co.
The former case dealt with a flagman, and plaintiff testified he
16 361 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1961).
17 1.4 at 147. cuotina 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant J 537 (1936). Nor can liability be
affected by promulgoting rules or establishing customs, practices or usage, or adopting constructons
thereto so as to absolve oneself of his own imputed ncgligence: Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Lloyd, 364
P.2d 873, 876 (Colo. 1961).
18 361 P.2d 144, 148 (Colo. 1961).
19 21 Colo. 393, 41 Pac. 505 (1895).
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relied solely upon the flagman for safe transit. The flagman was
well known to the public, having been stationed at the same place
for nearly ten years, flagging trains for two companies, and so far
as the public could know, was serving two companies. Thus the
court was justified in speaking of a holding out which leads to
estoppel and which requires reliance by the injured person. But
it can hardly be said that the driver of plaintiff's truck relied upon
the engineer of the train that caused the accident as being the
servant of the Santa Fe Railway, especially since the train was
that of the Colorado and Southern Railway. In the Gustafson case,
the plaintiff moved forward into the area of impact because the
-flagman signaled him to go ahead. Can it be said in Colorado &
S. Ry. v. Duffy Storage & Moving Van Co. that plaintiff would not
have placed himself in a perilous position except for his reliance on
a particular engineer as a servant of two railways?
2. Family Car Doctrine. - The indicia of ownership of a car is
sufficient to justify the application of the family car doctrine, with
resultant imputed negligence to the owner who permits members
of his household to drive it for their pleasure or convenience, even
if the owner of record does not drive the vehicle and has been repaid
the entire purchase price by the negligent member of the household
who drives the car. This is the rule of Appelhans v. Kirkwood.
20
3. No Indemnification If Not Vicarious. - William F. Larrick,
Inc. v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc.21 supports the general rule that a
20 365 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1961).
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master who ,actively supervises and participates in the negligent
acts of his serv~ant is not entitled to indemnity from the servant for
damages which .the master must pay to an injured person. The
active supervision and participation precludes application of the
rule where the master, whose liability is based upon the doctrine
of respondeat superior, is entitled to indemnification from the
servant.
22
4. Workmen's Compensation. - Agency law does not technically
include workmen's compensation cases since they are governed by
special statutes and strict case interpretations. Moreover, as to
vicarious liability, the law of agency is designed to aid an innocent
third party, while workmen's compensation law provides benefits
to an employee. Nevertheless, the Colorado cases on workmen's
compensation are important as aids in anticipating possible decisions
as to whether respondeat superior will apply in given situations.
Where an employee is "looking the town over" or "killing time,"
his injury does not arise out of and in the course of his employment
even though the employee is in the particular town for the purpose
of contacting an agent of his employer.
23
An employee sustained a fatal injury while playing for a softball
team sponsored by his employer. The game was conducted during
off hours and in a public park. The employer and the municipality
joined in financing the activity. The advertising value to the em-
ployer was negligible and the benefits derived by it consisted en-
tirely in the indirect improvement of employee morale. It was held
that the injury was not compensable as the activity was not an in-
cident of employment.
24
An employee of the Game and Fish Department was killed
while driving a department tractor down a mountain trail after
inspecting a privately owned television antenna behind his depart-
ment-owned residence. The accident was held to arise out of and
within the scope of employment.2 5 The supreme court reasoned that
because deceased was on 24-hour call, 7 days per week, was
required to live on department property in a remote area, was
expected to maintain the premises, including residence and appur-
tenances, and because the use of television was approved as a
morale factor, the activity (repairing the antenna) was a direct
and real benefit to his employer, as distinguished from Lindsay v.
Public Service Co. 26
A Denver geologist was employed by Geophoto to perform work
in Lybia." After completing his mission, he and his wife, on travel
orders from Geophoto, returned to the United States enroute to
Denver. While returning by car to Denver, the geologist was fatally
injured in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania. At the time of
the accident, the geologist was on the Pennsylvania turnpike travel-
ing in an easterly direction. Defendants claimed no liability because
the deceased was traveling east, away from Denver, at the time
22 Hamm v. Thompson, 143 Colo. 298, 353 P.2d 73 (1960).
23 General Plant Protection Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1961). There is a
strong and compelling dissent by Justice Frantz.
24 Lindsay v. Public Service Co., 362 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1961).
25 Game & Fish Dep't v. Pardoo, 363 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1961).
26362 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1961).
27 Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 363 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1961).
"DICTA
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of the accident, and was thus in a personal activity not within the
course of his employment.
In the following language the supreme court held the death
was compensable:
It seems clear that the plaintiff, who was traveling pur-
suant to company orders, was within the scope and cover-
age of the Act even though he was at the moment of
impact driving in the wrong direction. It would be both
illogical and unjust to hold the injury non-compensable
because of a temporary direction departure occurring in the
course of a covered journey of several thousand miles.
Claimants satisfied their burden when they showed .. .
traveling pursuant to orders. It was incumbent on the
insurer to show a specific deviation.
2
"The only evidence offered before the commission was offered
on behalf of the claimants.
29
The court goes astray in delving at great length into the "dual
purpose" theory (as presented by Larson on Workmen's Compen-
sation 30) and in only casually justifying its decision on the basis of
a negligible deviation.
31
The dual purpose theory, as stated by Justice Cardozo in Marks'
Dependents v. Gray32 and interpreted by Larson,33 is that the injury
is compensable if it occurred on a trip which was concurrently for
business and pleasure, and where, if the pleasure portion were
cancelled, the trip for business would have had to be made anyway,
if not by the specific traveler, then by some other employee at
another time.
In all the dual purpose cases cited by Larson, both personal
and business purposes are set forth. But if there was a personal
purpose for the geologist's deviation, it was not stated in the
supreme court's decision.
34
Moreover, the cases cited by the court from Larson 35 are simply
illustrations of the dual purpose rule, and are not necessarily
germane to a deviation situation. At the risk of presenting too stark
an explanation, it could be said that dual purpose is concerned with
the reasons for originally beginning a journey or a particular portion
of a journey, while deviation is concerned with the geographical
location of (a) the accident, and (b) the employment destination.
In National Sugar Mfg. Co. v. Bauer,36 a factory superintendent,
who was responsible for efficient operations of the factory, had no
specific working hours and often made trips combining company
business with pleasure or personal affairs. His wife often accom-
panied him. At the time of his death, he was driving from the plant
to Pueblo. His wife was riding with him to do some shopping in the
2, Id. at 649.
29 Id. at 647.
30 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 18.12 (1961).
31 Id. §8 19.50, 25.00.
32 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929).
33 1 Larson, supra note 30, § 18.13.
34 The supreme court does recognize that if an employee is troveling away from home, then
staying at a motel, eating at a restaurant, and going to and from those places comes w;thin the
compensation act. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Caom'n, 363 P.2d 646, 648 (Colo. 1961).
:15 1 Larson, supra note 30, § 18.12.
:16 366 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1961).
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city. The evidence showed he had stated he would not go to Pueblo
in such weather "if I did not have to;" he took some specifications
from the factory with him; and the 'company had considerable
business dealings in the city. The court held he was within the
scope of employment when the accident occurred, but no mention
was made in the decision of the "dual purpose" rule stated in
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n.37
5. Loaned Servant-Whose Employee? - Plaintiff Erbes was an
employee of M & A Enterprises,38 a firm which contracted with
defendant Sugar Company to construct sugar bins on the latter's
property. M & A rented a crane and operator (defendant Nickle)
from Sugar Company. While Nickle was operating the crane, he
negligently injured plaintiff. The plaintiff collected workmen's
compensation and sued both defendants for negligence, alleging
Nickle was the servant of Sugar Company. The jury verdict for
plaintiff was affirmed by the supreme court.
The question involved was whether the loaned servant became
the servant of the special employer (M & A), or remained the ser-
vant of his general employer (Sugar Company).39 Nickle was paid
by his general employer. There was a rental of a valuable ma-
chine, together with a skilled operator, for a short period of time.
Sugar Company could replace Nickle at any time, they were respon-
sible for maintenance and repair of the crane, and M & A had no
right to discharge Nickle.
The supreme court has stressed the business of renting equip-
ment as a strong indication of intent of the general employer not
to release control of its servant.40 Sugar Company contended it
was not in the business of renting cranes, but the evidence showed
the rental had been provided to others doing work on the Sugar
Company premises, which, while a restricted type of rental, was
37 363 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1961).
38 Great Western Sugar Co. v. Erbes, 367 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1961).
39 For an interesting Colorado resume of modern loaned servant cases, read Chartier v. Winslow,
142 Colo. 294, 350 P.2d 1044 (1960) (regular employee sues loaned servant's general employer);
Jacobson v. Doan, 136 Colo. 496, 319 P.2d 975 (1957) (loaned servant sues special employer); and
Netherton v. Haver, 140 Colo. 140, 342 P.2d 671 (1959) (innocent third person sues loaned servant's
general employer).
40 Chartier v. Winslow, 142 Colo. 294, 311, 350 P.2d 1044, 1053 (1960). Restatement, Torts, § 227,
: ". . . the fact that the general employer is in the business of renting machines and men is
relevant, since in such cases there is more likely to be an intent to retain control over the
instrumentality. The person who is not in such business and who, gratuitously or not, as a matter
not within his general business enterprise, permits his servant and instrumentality to assist another,
is more apt to intend to surrender control."
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still a business of renting. The supreme court felt the rental issue
was relevant, but not determinative of the issue, and that the
question of "loaned servant" was properly submitted to the jury.
41
E. Liability of Agent to Third Person - Contract
When a person signs his name to a simple contract, without
designating that he does so as an officer or agent or in a repre-
sentative capacity acting for or on behalf of another, and the
principal's name does not appear in the instrument as principal
of the person signing, then the one signing is personally liable on
the contract so signed. The president of a corporation discovered
this, to his detriment, in Sago v. Ashford,42 when he responded to
an offer of sale by writing at the bottom of the offering letter "we
wish to order this equipment as specified above. Fred Sago.
' 43
Although the term "undisclosed principal" was not used by the
court in its decision, it was present as an added factor when the
court stated ". . . evidence was sufficient . . . that neither the
instrument itself nor other circumstances advised the seller of the
existence of the corporation or the claimed representative capacity
of Sago.'"44 When there is an "undisclosed principal" both the prin-
cipal and agent are liable in the alternative.
One issue is not clear in the decision and might disturb the
reader. The written offer was directed to "Howard Sand and
Gravel Co. - Mr. Fred Sago." The testimony of the seller at the
trial left a strong inference that the seller considered the company
as the "trade name" of Mr. Sago, and an indication by the court to
this effect would have been helpful.
In Frye v. Switzer,45 the plaintiff sought to collect from an agent
of a home-building corporation for items sold to the corporation.
Plaintiff claimed defendant made a personal commitment to pay
a debt carried on plaintiff's books as a corporation debt. The supreme
court found that the language used 46 to promise payment was in-
sufficient to warrant a judgment against defendant.
In Empire Diesel, Inc. v. Brown,47 the plaintiff, a former em-
ployee, sought to collect loans he claimed were made to his corporate
employer. Defendant claimed the loans were made to Mr. Clark,
the president of the corporation, and not to the corporation itself.
Defendant was in the business of repairing trucks, and loans were
made to purchase needed items of repair. Clark requested the:
loans, the checks named Clark as payee, and the money was deposit-
ed to the corporation account.
41 The circle is now completed as to when an injured employee may bring an action for
negligence rather than recover only under workmen's compensation. (a) General contractor's
employee sues landowner for negligence when contractor carries workmen's compensation: Great
Western Sugar Co. v. Erbes, supra note 38; (b) Sub-contractor's employee sues general contractor
for negligence when sub-contractor carries workmen's compensation: Whiting v. Farnsworth &
Chambers Co., 293 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1961); (c) General contractor's employee sues sub-contractor
for negligence when general contractor carries workmen's compensation: Chartier v. Winslow, 142
Colo. 294, 317, 350 P.2d 1044, 1056 (1960).
42 358 P.2d 599 (Colo. 1961).
43 Id. at 600.
44 Ibid.
45 359 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1961).
46 Id. at 371. "Q ... you promised to make payment . .?""A. As we could, because the
corporation had homes they had money coming from, surely." C".. Frye said he would pay
the balance due . . . out of 'closings' that he had coming up...") The supreme court said: "It
was the corporation, not Frye, which was 'closing' deals for the sale of homes."




[HI e made use of personal pronouns in referring to Clark
and himself. He also mentioned Clark by name. He
explained that Clark was solely in charge of the business
... and that no thought was given to a distinction between
Clark and the corporation as referring to separate entities.
This was not natural to Brown, Clark was the corporation
and the corporation was Clark.
48
The court held that under the circumstances, "... it is a per-
missible, if not necessary, inference that the loans were made to
the corporation.
'49
F. Attorneys as Agents
In Eadon v. Reuler,50 a frustrated divorce-litigant turned upon
the attorneys who represented the parties, alleging fraud, conni-
vance and conspiracy. The supreme court upheld the dismissal of
the litigant's complaint seeking damages and in language, which
attorneys perhaps should frame and place in view for clients to
see, states:
A lawyer does not guarantee results. He merely undertakes
to use his best skill and judgment. A result unsatisfactory
to the litigant scarcely justifies a suit charging the lawyers
with fraud and conspiracy. Efforts of a lawyer to obtain an
amicable disposition do not subject him to a charge of
treason.51
Rupp v. Cool 52 contains a definite admonition to attorneys that
they are to be treated as a special class in contracting for fees with
their clients because of the confidential relationship involved. The
plaintiff, employed by defendant as his attorney, rendered the
required services and his bill for $2500. The client tendered $1000,
and refused to comply with monthly statements which followed,
requesting payment of the remaining $1500. Nothing was said about
compensation until the work was completed, and the testimony
.was in conflict as to whether the defendant, at that time, protested
and refused to pay the entire sum.
48 Id. at 965-66.
49 Id. at 966.
50361 P.2d 445 (Colo. 1961).
51 Id. at 450.
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The supreme court stated the following rules: (a) An attorney
and his prospective client may enter into a contract with reference
to fees to be charged and such a contract will be treated and con-
strued as other contracts. The client is regarded as competent to
judge for himself what is a proper sum to pay for services, and it
cannot be repudiated merely because of the subsequent confidential
relationship.53 (b) After the confidential relationship of attorney
and client exists, the law governing fee contracts subsequently
entered into between them is very different. The burden is then on
the attorney to prove that the agreement was fairly and openly
made, that it was supported by an adequate consideration, that he
gave the client full knowledge of the facts and of his legal rights,
and that the services to be performed were reasonably worth the
amount stated in the agreement.
54
Several other cases dealt with attorneys as agents. 55
G. Real Estate Agents
"[W] ithout paying for the seed he sought to reap the field that
the broker had sowed. The scheme is very old, but so is the law
which frustrates it." 56 Brewer v. Williams57 differs from most suits
by real estate brokers for commissions in that the contract of
employment, resulting in a principal-agent relationship, was oral
and implied from the particular circumstances of the case, namely;
awareness, encouragement, and repeated inquiries by the owner
of the progress made to effect a sale.
Defendant circumvented the brokers and sold directly to pur-
chasers that the brokers had produced. No commission was due
the brokers, defendant urged, because they failed to comply with
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 117-2-1 (1953), which requires finding a purchaser
ready to complete purchase on terms proposed by the seller. The
court found that no rigidity was ever placed upon the brokers as to
the types of offers defendant would consider.
This case reaffirmed the rule that a broker who procures a
purchaser ready, willing and able to purchase upon the terms and
conditions imposed by the owner is entitled to his commission even
though the owner and the purchaser thereafter conduct further
negotiations resulting in a change of the terms.ss
H. Miscellaneous
Fistell v. Centennial Truck Lines, Inc. 9 would appear to be
authority for the following general rule: After a sale, when the
53 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client 181 (1937).
54 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 204(3) (1937); Enyort v. Orr, 78 Colo. 6, 238 Pac. 29 (1925).
55 Attorneys should note, as pointed out in Burgess v. Federated Credit Service, Inc., 365 P.2d 264
(Colo. 1961), that Colorado's statutes provide inroads into areas which are mistakenly considered the
private domains of attorneys. Thus, prosecution of suits in courts which ore not courts of record need
not be carried on by licensed attorneys. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 79.5-17 (1953). In workmen's compensa-
tion cases, either side may be represented by oersons other than attorneys. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-
14-3 (1953). Whatley v. Wood, 366 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1961), points out that an attorney for the direc-
tor-trustees of a defendant corporation cannot, in the process of discharging the employment entered
upon as counsel, acqure the property of the corporation.
56 Brewer v. Williams, 362 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Colo. 1961).
57 Ibid.
58 Id. at 1036. Compare the Brewer case with Scott v. Huntzinger, 365 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1961),
where the court held that a broker under agreement providing for commission if owners sold a lease-
hold interest to optionee as provided in the agreement had no right to a commission where the op-
tionee did not exercise the option thereunder, notwithstanding the fact that optionee subsequently,
acting on behalf of himself and others, resumed negotiations culminating in purchase, absent any
showing of bad faith or conspiracy to let the option lapse with intent to deprive the broker of his
commission.
59 359 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961).
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buyer requests the seller to ship the goods to the buyer, the
seller, in choosing without negligence a carrier to deliver the goods,
is acting as agent for the buyer-principal, and is not liable for
damages to the buyer caused by non-delivery by the carrier of
some of the goods purchased.
Wilder v. Baker60 is authority for the rule that notice to an agent
imputes knowledge to the principal only when it is within the
scope of the agent's authority to accept notice. Here, plaintiff sued
defendant as one of two joint obligors. Defendant pleaded bank-
ruptcy prior to suit, but his bankruptcy schedule did not list the
transaction with plaintiff. Defendant advised plaintiff's agent of the
bankruptcy proceedings, but the only evidence of authority of the
agent was to collect payments from defendant and apply them to
the obligation owed. "There is nothing in the evidence to indicate
it was within the scope of . . . authority to accept notice of bank-
ruptcy . . .on behalf of the plaintiff and, therefore, the knowledge
of the ... bankruptcy ... cannot be imputed to the plaintiff." 61 The
court fails to cite any authority for its decision, although the fact
situation is not uncommon.
6 2
Unless an agent is himself responsible for unpaid sums due his
principal from third persons, the agent is not the real party in
interest to sue such third persons, according to Baumgartner v.
Burt.63 In this case, insurance agents sued the insured to recover
unpaid premiums for policies issued by the insurance company.
The supreme court held that unless the agent is personally liable
to insurer for the premiums, then the general rule applies that an
agent cannot maintain a suit in its own name for an insurance
premium due its principal.
II. CORPORATIONS
A. Procedural Requirements
State of Colorado ex rel. Gentles v. Barnholt64 was an action by
Gentles in the nature of quo warranto to test the right of the
Barnholt slate of directors to hold office as directors of the cor-
poration. The pertinent issue presented to the supreme court was
on allegations that Barnholt caused treasury stock of the corpor-
ation to be sold, after the election, to a Henry Pui Chun of Honolulu,
Hawaii. Having accomplished this, Barnholt then caused the votes
of such stock to be counted as cast for his slate at the election.
Barnholt claims that Chun must be joined as an indispensable
party. The supreme court ruled that a non-resident shareholder
need not be joined if the action is merely one to review the pro-
priety of the election and does not seek any action directly or
indirectly against the particular shareholder whose vote is being
challenged. The supreme court felt that to hold otherwise would
result in an impotent right to challenge an election, since personal
60 362 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1961).
61 Id. at 1047.
62 2 Am. Jur. Agency § 374 (1936).
63 365 P.2d 681 (Colo. 1961). Several other minor Colorado cases dealing with the law of Agency
;re: Minissole v. Goldman, 363 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1961) (real estate agents); Lasnetske v. Parres, 365
P.2d 250 (Colo. 1961) (vicarious liability, joint ownership of car, right to exercise control); and Bun-
nell v. Iverson, 364 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1961) (symbolic delivery to agent of gift cousa mortis).
64 358 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1961).
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service could not be had upon Chun until he came within the
borders of Colorado, which was unlikely.
The legality of the issuance of the stock to Chun cannot be
adjudicated without his presence, but his right to vote in the
election could be, according to the Delaware cases adopted by the
supreme court as establishing a better approach to the problem.65
In Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc., 6 the supreme court again
points out that business may be sufficient to subject a foreign cor-
poration to service of process within the state, and yet insufficient
to subject the corporation to the power of the state to impose reg-
ulations upon its activities.
Plaintiff sought money due him as commissions, but the com-
plaint was filed more than six years after the cause of action
accrued. Defendant claimed the action was barred by the statute
of limitations, but plaintiff alleged that the foreign corporation
was not licensed to do business in this state, was absent therefrom,
and the statute had been tolled.
However, the corporation had since 1937 been selling in Colo-
rado through local salesmen who carried samples and merchandise
catalogues. Customer orders were given to the local salesmen who
chose the means of delivery, assisted in collecting delinquent
accounts, solicited new accounts and checked on customer credit
ratings. The supreme court held this constituted sufficient "pres-
ence" for service of process, and that an entry of summary judg-
ment which dismissed plaintiff's case based upon the statute of
limitations, was not error.
B. Fiduciary Violations
American Founders, a general life insurance corporation, sued
Colorado Management, a counseling and management corporation,
to recover $32,839 paid to the latter under a service contract to
last for ten years, and which was entered into on March 1, 1956.67
The supreme court held that Colorado Management breached the
contract after March 1, 1957, by ceasing to render services required
by the contract, and that such breach justified American Founders
65 Standard Scale & Supply Corp. v. Chappel, 16 Del. 331, 141 Ati. 191 (1928); In re Diamond
State Brewery, 22 Del. 364, 2 A.2d 254 (1938).
6836.4 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
67 Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 359 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1961).
Companion case on options, with same title is 367 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1961).
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in terminating the contract. The court found that Colorado Man-
agement had earned $6,248 of the amount paid to it, and that
American Founders was entitled to a judgment for the remainder.
Basically, this was all that was actually necessary to render a
decision. But because of the lower court's ruling of a void contract
and the various arguments and theories presented by counsel on
each side, the court produced what appears to this writer to be an
extreme amount of dictum regarding voidable contracts between
corporations having directors in common, and ratification.
Six of the eight directors of American Founders were present
at a meeting at which all approved the contract with Colorado
Management. Five directors were necessary for a quorum. Three
of the six were directors of both corporations. The court held this
did not render the contract void, but voidable, if found to be unfair,
even if there was no taint of fraud. But the contract is voidable
regardless of its fairness, the court states, if the vote of a director,
who is a director of both corporations, is necessary to form a
quorum and effectuate the transaction. Since there were only
three "disinterested" directors, the contract was voidable. 68
This voidable contract was not ratified, the court asserted, and
American Founders is not estopped from maintaining its action
because it accepted some services offered by Colorado Manage-
ment and in return made some payments. The court said, "This is
not a situation where the court is faced with a contract fully
performed by one or both of the parties. -69 (Whether a divisible
contract could ever be ratified under this reasoning is speculative.)
The court held that approval by American Founders' board of
directors of the minutes of the meeting which approved the con-
tract is not a legalization of the invalid acts recorded therein, but
only an acknowledgement that the secretary had properly recorded
the acts of the board. Further, approval by the stockholders at
their annual meeting of all lawful acts of the board for the pre-
ceding year is not ratification unless it is clearly shown that the
stockholders had full knowledge of all material facts and thereafter
knowingly accepted and approved the contract.
In Crowley v. Green,70 seller, of California, sold two pneudraulic
lifts to Provision Corporation. While Provision had the power to
buy and sell equipment, it was really not part of its business
activities. It had no use for the lifts and was insolvent to the
point where it could not have afforded the expense of the purchase.
Green was an officer and director of Provision and was in the
meat packing business at the same address as Provision. The lifts
were useful in Green's business and he had himself ordered them.
As soon as the lifts arrived, they ended up in Green's meat packing
business where they were used. Seller sued Green for the pur-
chase price, and the supreme court held that Provision was used
only as a conduit through which the lifts passed uninterruptedly
from seller to Green as the ultimate purchaser (even though the
contract was in Provision's name and. Green was not the sole owner
68 This should allay the fears of author Ernest W. Lohf, in One Year Review of Corporations,
Partnership and Agency, 37 DICTA 11, 14, note 11 (1960).
69 Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., supra note 67, at 669.
70 365 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1961).
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL, 1962
of Provision). Seller maintained the contract was in Provision's
name as a favor of Green, so that he could use a Provision truck
to transport the lifts from California to Denver. Green contended
Provision was buying the lifts for the purpose of resale.
The court avoided establishing a rule as to the "conduit" role
of Provision, which was the contracting party, and in order to
hold Green liable, the court tore into Green's defense that he was
a secondary purchaser for value. (Green contended Provision owed
him money and he set off the debt for the value of the lifts.) A
director of an insolvent corporation cannot prefer himself, said
the court, as a creditor of that corporation, and divert assets to
discharge an obligation to him to the detriment of other creditors.
He is a trustee for the creditors as well as for the corporation, and
if he does purchase corporate assets, he must account for the full
value of the property purchased to those who have the right to
demand it.7
The court made no mention of creditors other than seller, who
was awarded the full amount. Query: If other creditors had sued
on their debts, would they have been entitled to share in the sum
to be paid by Green?
C. Shifting Liability to Directors or Promoters
Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Holzwarth72 deals with an
attempt by a corporation to divert its liability to plaintiff under a
stock repurchase agreement, onto its president and one of its direc-
tors. The supreme court held the company to its contract to repur-
chase. A letter written after the contractual rights and duties were
defined and fixed, which was signed by the president and the
director as individuals without indication of representative capacity
and which stated, "We also agree ... to repurchase the . . .shares"
was held to be the letter of the company rather than the individuals.
The letter was on a company letterhead and dealt largely with the
affairs of the company.
The fact that the shares in question were transferred to plaintiff
from the president's holdings and not from treasury stock was
considered by the court to be immaterial. The court stated, "The
company could make a lawful agreement to sell stock which it did
not then own, or it could retain its then holdings and fill the
order from shares owned by others.
'7 3
Another director of the company was held liable to plaintiff
for the damages which occurred by the company's failure to repur-
chase the stock. This defendant was director at the time the com-
pany was insolvent, and he declared and paid a dividend. The fact
that one statute74 provided civil liability and another statute75
provided criminal liability for such action was not considered by
the court to be inconsistent or in conflict.
71 For another case holding the surviving directors of a defunct corporation as trustees for the
creditors and stockholders with a fiduciary relationship which precludes the directors from acquiring
any interest in corporate assets, other than as trustees, see Whatley v. Wood, 366 P.2d 570 (Cola.
1961).
72 366 P.2d 377 (Colo. 1961).
73 Id. at 382.
74 Colo. Rev. Stat. 31-2-12 (1953).
75 Colo. Rev. Stat. 72-2-3 (1953).
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Quaker Hill, Inc. v. Parr"8 supports the general rule that pro-
moters of a corporation are personally liable on their contracts,
even though made on behalf of a corporation to be formed, except
where the contracting party agrees to look to the corporation and
not to the promoters for payment. Supporting the use of the ex-
ception to the general rule in this case was the fact that Quaker
Hill, the plaintiff, acting through its agent, was well aware that
the corporation was not formed, but, nevertheless, urged that the
contract be made in the name of the proposed corporation. Not
only were the defendants not promoters of a corporation at the
time of the contract, the court stated, but the agent for the plaintiff
even suggested the name to be used for the then non-existent
corporation.
III. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Rights Upon Dissolution and After Termination
Davis v. Davis77 is concerned with the best method for distribu-
tion of partnership property upon dissolution of the partnership.
The supreme court feels that when the partners cannot agree78 and
dissolution and winding up of the partnership is under the auspices
of the court, then the court has discretion to provide either for divi-
sion or sale of the property, depending upon the circumstances
of each case. The court also states that it is the general rule that
in an action for a partnership accounting and dissolution, the entire
partnership property will be converted to cash.
7 9
Quelland and Roy 0 became partners in 1952. Together they
leased real estate and constructed and operated a coffee shop and
cocktail lounge on the premises. Later, they orally dissolved the
partnership and Roy took over the business. He orally agreed to
pay "Quelland 1/4 percent of the gross sales of all products sold
on the premises '8 1 for the duration of the lease. Roy then built a
"tap room" and "dining room" on the premises with his own money.
The issue was whether Quelland was entitled to his percentage of
76 364 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961).
77 366 P.2d 857 (Colo. 1961).
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-38(1) (1953). "When dissolution is caused . . . each partner . . . un-
less otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the
surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners."
79 Some dictum concerning joint or joint and several liability of partners was deleted from the
opinion prior to its final publication.
80 Quelland v. Roy, 365 P.2d 899 (Colo. 1961).
81 Id. at 899.
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gross sales only from the two rooms built prior to dissolution
(which percentages were always paid) or also from the two rooms
built after dissolution.
The lower court approved a motion to dismiss on behalf of
Roy after Quelland put on his evidence, and this was affirmed by
the supreme court which held that a partner leaving the business
is only entitled to a return on the use of his capital by the continu-
ing partner in the absence of an express agreement. He is not
entitled to earnings on new capital to which he did not contribute.
One point was not made clear by the court. A sub-tenant had
taken over operation of the "dining room" (built after dissolution)
and the "coffee shop" (built prior to dissolution). The sub-tenant
was paying the 13/4 percent of gross sales on food sold in both
rooms to Quelland "in accordance with Roy's agreement. '8 2 Is Quel-
land still entitled to a percent of gross sales on food sold in the
"dining room"?
Roy, by counter-claim, sought to become owner of the entire
lease on the real estate. The court held Quelland could only be
divested of his interest as a tenant in common by operation of law
or by assignment of his interest. There was no written assignment
as provided by the statute of frauds, and the evidence showed that.
up to the time of litigation, Quelland had always been considered
a joint lessee. What was not mentioned in the decision is that
under the Uniform Partnership Act, such assignment would be by
operation of law as to old and new creditors, even if no assignment
were made.a3
B. Partnership Property - Limited Partnership
Wise v. Nu-Tone Products Co. 84 affirms the general rule that
unless the contrary intent appears, property acquired with partner-
ship funds is partnership property, 5 and this presumption is not
negated merely because the property is placed in the name of one
of the individual members of the partnership.8 6
The interesting aspect is that this was a limited partnership and
"the Uniform Limited Partnership Act does not have a comparable
or parallel statutory provision"87 to the Uniform Partnership Act 8
as to purchase of property with partnership funds. The supreme
court based its decision on Colo. Rev. Stat. §104-2-9 (1953) which
provides that "in any case not provided for in this article, the rules
of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern."
C. Employee v. Partners
In Pospicil v. Hammers,89 a car salesman sued for unpaid
commissions. The employer was originally an individual, later, a
partnership, and last, a corporation. The salesman sued the in-
82 Id. at 900.
83 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-41(3) (1953). "When any partner retires . . . and the business of the
dissolved partnership is continued . . . with the consent of the retired partners . . . but without any
assignment of his right in partnership property, rights of creditors of the dissolved partnership and
of the creditors of the person . . . continuing the business shall be as if such assignment had been
made."
84 367 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1961).
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-8 (1953).
86 Oswald v. Down, 143 Colo. 487, 354 P.2d 505 (1960).
87 Supra note 84 at 349.
88 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-8 (1953).
89 365 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1961).
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dividual, the three partners, and the corporation. Judgment was
entered in the lower court against the defendants, and each of
them for $819. The corporation liability for the entire amount of
unpaid commissions was approved by the supreme court, but not
the judgment against the individual or the partners. The reasoning
of the court was that plaintiff failed to establish when the individ-
ual's liability terminated or when that of the partnership began,
and the amount of unpaid commissions earned under each separate
employer. The court pointed out that the individual and the
members of the partnership could not have been held responsible
for any commissions earned by plaintiff following his employment
by the corporation.
D. Joint Ventures
While not stated in specific terms, Griffith v. Cooper9" appears
to support the general rule that joint ventures will be governed
by the law of partnership. Thus, when four joint venturers agree
to share profits equally (and apparently nothing is stated as to
sharing of losses) the losses are shared equally.
The joint venturers were engaged in construction of sixteen
homes. Three of them, as plaintiffs, sought an accounting. Each
had received advance withdrawals totaling $11,000. The master's
report was unfavorable to them and in favor of defendant Griffith
for losses of $17,000. The trial court ignored the master's report
and left the parties where they were before the accounting. On
appeal by defendant Griffith, the plaintiffs contended they were
independent contractors rather than joint venturers and thus
entitled to retain the benefits received without having to share
the losses. The supreme court held they were bound by the account-
ing and by their admissions in the trial court that they were joint
venturers and must therefore contribute to Griffith for their propor-
tionate share of the total loss.
90 359 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1961).
DICTA
QUALIFICATION QUICKENER #3
Among the time savers developed by CT for use by lawyers about
to qualify a client in a foreign state are CT Data Sheets. They sum-
marize all data needed by the lawyer to complete qualification forms.
When you are about to qualify a client, telephone us for the CT
Data Sheet for the state (or states) on which you are working. CT has
an individual Data Sheet for each state, each Canadian province, each
U. S. Territory and possession. They are furnished without extra
charge as part of CT's qualification services (for lawyers only).
OTHER CT QUALIFICATION QUICKENERS
-all developed to make a lawyer's task of qualifying a client in an out-
side state easier, less time-consuming and less expensive to handle-
1. Information helpful to the
lawyer in determining whether
or not a client's out-of-state
activities require qualification.
2. Information on a state's in-
itial and annual costs, qualifica-
tion requirements and penalties
for failure to qualify.
4. Information on timing of qual-
ifications so that, when practi-
cable, the lawyercan, by delaying
qualification until after certain
dates, save his client the cost
and bother of paying taxes and
filing reports.
5. Information from which the
lawyer, by comparison, can
determine advisability of incor-
porating a separate corporation
rather than qualifying the exist-
ing corporation.
6. CT's continent-wide system
of offices and representatives to
expedite the filing of the lawyer's
papers.
R QAIIAINADSTATUTORYIN THE INCORPORATION UALC TION AN A
PRESENTATION OF CORPORATIONS, THE CORPORATION
TRUST COMPANY, CT CORPORATION SYSTEM AND
ASSOCIATED COMPANIES DEAL WITH AND
ATFOR LAWYERS EXCLUSIyELY
SERVING COLORADO LAWYERS
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
1700 BROADWAY
DENVER 2, COLORADO
-Abor 5-8148
